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IMPERIALISM, DEPENDENCY, AND SOCIAL CLASS1 
by William Hansen and Brigitte Schulz 
I. Introduction 
The purpose of this essay is to examine what has become known in the 
language of post-World War II social science as "dependency theory." Although 
all variants of this dependency theory are more or less nationalist and 
anti-imperialist, they are not uniformly socialist or Marxist. That is to 
say, many of those working within the broad category of dependency theory are 
not fundamentally anti-capitalist. Thus, they do not articulate a socialist 
program for breaking the constraints they see as being responsible for 
poverty, backwardness, stagnation, and underdevelopment. 
In the writings of these non-socialist or "bourgeois-nationalist 112 
writers, the problem was seen merely as the domination of weaker economies by 
stronger ones. If this domination could be removed, so would be the economic 
backwardness that characterizes most of the Third World. The result would be 
capital accumulation and an independent, autonomous but nevertheless 
capitalist development. "Independent" or "autonomous II capitalist development 
should not be equated with some abstract notion of "absolute autarky." 
Absolute autarky is here understood to mean the complete severing of all 
economic links that any~'-,,particular political-economic formation has that 
extend beyond its boundaries. It is, however, argued that some degree of 
autocthonous development is necessary if structural underdevelopment is to be 
Overcome. 3 
This is in distinction to most modern bourgeois development theory --
dressed-up versions of Ricardo 1 s law of comparative advantage -- which argues 
that the international economic system is and should be 11 interdependent, 11 that 
greater economic integration allows 11a greater specialization in a wider 
division of labor and often a better utilization of the comparative advantages 
of each region or population group • .,4 Thus, what characterizes the 
existing international economic system is not simply a relationship of 
dependence on the industrialized countries by the underdeveloped world, but a 
dependence of both upon each other. While this may be true in the broad 
overall view, the dependency school argues that this relationship is marked by 
inequality and domination; that the Third World, rather than being 
characterized by independent capital accumulation, has been subordinated to 
the needs of the industrialized capitalist countries. 
One of the basic assumptions of dependency theory, whether radical or 
bourgeois-natibnalist, is that the existing international economic system is 
structured in such a way that most of the "social surplus 11 produced in the 
Third World is siphoned off through numerous mechanisms such as the 
international banking system, various governmental or international lending 
institutions, and transnational corporations headquartered in Western Europe 
and North America. The rest accrues to a narrow stratum of the population of 
any particular underdeveloped country; a stratum whose primary function is to 
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act, as it were, as local representatives of international capital and to 
facilitate the penetration and continued exploitation of the underdeveloped 
world. 
Neither radical nor bourgeois-nationalist dependency theorists advocate 
"absolute autarky. 11 5 It is here, however, that their re spec ti ve 
strategies for political and economic development diverge. So far as we know, 
no one who is involved in the discussion of economic development, with the 
possible exception of P.T. Bauer,6 advocates the continuation of that 
condition that has become known as underdevelopment. Either implicitly or 
explicitly, any discussion of the origins and nature of economic development 
contains a strategy for its elimination. 
The radical 7 dependency school argues in essence that, given the 
present state of development of the international capitalist system, a broadly 
based, autonomous, internally-directed capitalist development in the Third 
World has become, not merely undesirable, but impossible. They thus assert 
that the only way in which backwardness, stagnation, and poverty can be 
overcome is through a socialist revolution in which all but those absolutely 
necessary links with the existing international economic system are broken. 
It is primarily with radical (socialist/Marxist) underdevelopment theory that 
this paper will concern itself. 
Underdevelopment theory is generally a phenomenon of the three-and-a-half 
decades after 1945. Prior to this period, most Marxists had concerned 
themselves with socialism and the struggle against capitalism as it applied to 
the working class in Europe and North America and the few enclaves outside 
that area containing a European working class. 
Marx himself, of course, had dealt with the "colonial question" 
particularly regarding India and Ireland 8 -- but it was primarily from the 
point of view of the effects of imperialism on the prospects for European 
revolution. Marx, particularly in his earlier wr1.t1.ngs, looked very 
positively on the long-term historical consequences of capitalist penetration 
of the Third World. Marx's view regarding India9 was that the railroad 
and modern industry would advance the productive forces there and, as a 
consequence, bring about the full proletarianization of the Indian society, 
thus liberating it from the static condition he labeled "Asiatic Despotism." 
Marx expressed similar sentiments in the Communist Manifesto: 
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments 
of production, by the immensely facilitated means of 
communication, draws all nations, even the most barbarian, 
into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are 
the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese 
walls, with which it forces the barbarian's intensely 
obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels 
all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois 
mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it 
calls civilization into their midst; i.e., to become 
bourgeois themselves. In a word, it creates a world after 
its own image.10 
In his later work it does appear that Marx was beginning to change his views 
regarding the historically positive effect that imperialism must necessarily 
have on pre-capitalist or "natural economies. 11 11 
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In his famous pamphlet on imperialism, Lenin did not discuss at length the 
effect of capitalist penetration on peasant societies as he, too, was 
examining its effects from the point of view of a European socialist. He did 
touch briefly, however, on one of the key arguments later propounded by many 
dependency theorists and that is the notion that the super-profits gained 
through imperialists ventures are used to bribe at least a sector of the 
European and North .American working class into accepting bourgeois 
hegemony.12 Lenin quoted Engels as having written that " ••• the workers 
merrily share the feast of England's monopoly of the colonies and world 
market, 11 and then himself wrote: 11The imperialist ideology also penetrates 
the working class. No Chinese Wall separates it from other classes." 13 
Rosa Luxemburg discussed the effects of imperialism on what she called 
11natural economies" at some length, but again, it was part of a larger work. 
Luxemburg, however, did begin to discuss the ways in which developed 
capitalism required, for continued accumulation, the existence of peasant or 
pre-capitalist economies: 
Yet, as we have seen, capitalism in its full maturity also 
depends in all respects on non-capitalist strata and 
social organizations existing side by side with it •••• The 
interrelations of accumulating capital and non- capitalist 
forms of production extend over values as well as over 
material conditions, for constant capital, variable 
capital, and surplus value alike. The non-capitalist mode 
of production is the given historical setting for this 
process. Since the accumulation of capital becomes 
impossible in all points without non-capitalist surround-
ings ••. capital needs the means of production and the labor 
power of the whole globe for untrammelled accumulation; it 
cannot manage without the natural resources and the labor 
power of all territories. 14 
Luxemburg even anticipated some of the later arguments of dependency 
theory when she suggested that capital accumulation could take place in a 
setting where the full proletarianization of labor had not taken place -- or 
what she called "predominantly non-capitalist societies. 1115 Likewise, she 
anticipated the dependency argument concerning the "underdeveloping" effect 
capitalist penetration has: 
Yet if the countries of those branches of production are 
predominantly non-capitalist, capital will endeavour to 
establish domination over those countries and societies. 
And, in fact, primitive conditions allow of a greater 
drive and of far more ruthless measures than could be 
tolerated under purely capitalist social conditions 16 
(Italics ours). 
Much of the impetus for radical underdevelopment theory after World War II 
stemmed from three sources. First, and most importantly, was the obvious 
inadequacy of so-called 11modernization theory." The forces of anti-
colonialism, dialectically created b_y colonialism itself, were brought to a 
head by World War II. Before becoming U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster 
Dulles wrote: 
When the fighting in World War II drew to a close, the 
greatest single political issue was the colonial issue. 
If the West had attempted to perpetuate the status quo of 
colonialism, it would have made violent revolution 
inevitable and defeat inevitable. The only policy that 
might succeed was that of bringing independence peacefully 
to the more advanced of the 700,000,000 dependent 
persons.15 
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Thus, between 1948 and 1960 most of what had been under the direct 
political and economic control of the Western colonial powers reached 
independence. Most liberal bourgeois thought argued now that the legal 
constraints of colonialism had been broken, the newly independent countries of 
the world, if protected of course from communism, would inevitably develop 
along the lines followed by capitalist development in Europe. With 
independence would come increasing urbanization and education, the adoption of 
Western political attitudes and structures, increased Western "aid" and 
capital investment, the consequence of which would be the promised material 
advance and a "modern" society. The fact that most of Latin America which had 
been free of colonial rule for over 125 years had not developed in this manner 
could, of course, not be explained by this overly optimistic theory. 
The second source of dependency theory was a felt need to combat the 
overly mechanistic "theory of stages" that characterized the thinking of most 
orthodox Communist Parties. This "orthodox" theory vulgarized much of the 
Marxian model by attempting to turn in into a series of rigid formulae that 
brooked no deviation from a series of linear steps that supposedly 
characterized the economic and social history of Europe. Under this scheme, 
Europe marched directly from primitive communism through successive modes of 
production characterized as slave, feudal, and capitalist. By extension, all 
social formations must follow this route. This analysis led to styling the 
Third World as being feudal with the next necessary linear step being that of 
bringing about the "bourgeois-democratic revolution" -- a formulation so vague 
as to be generally useless. 18 This formulation was to have political 
consequences such as the South African Communist Party support for the racist 
white miners in the Rand strike of 1923 (Africans were pre-capitalist while 
the striking whites were proletarians); support for Chiang's Kuomintang 
against Mao's Communists in the late twenties; opposition by the official 
Communist Party to the Cuban Revolution until shortly before its victory. 
This attitude was characteristic of most Third World "official II Communist 
Parties until only recently. 19 
The third of these sources of dependency theory was the need to understand 
why the optimism expressed by Marx in the Communist Manifesto regarding the 
revolutionary role of expanding capitalism had not resulted in vibrant 
capitalist economies mirroring those of Europe and North America but instead 
in economic stagnation, increasing poverty, and advancing underdevelopment in 
most parts of the world. 
The first section of this paper reviews some of the dependency literature, 
followed in the second section by a review of the attacks levelled against it 
by its radical critics. We do not view these two schools of analytic thought 
to be inherently antagonistic and conclude the paper with an argument for a 
synthesis of the two. Just as development and underdevelopment are 
dialectically related, so internal class relations cannot be analysed without 
looking to their origins and present articulation to the present global system 
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of capitalist production. To ignore or reject as irrelevant either of them 
would seem to be a mistake of enormous proportion. 
II. Dependency Theory 
Dependency theory, contrary to conventional liberal analysis, argues that 
11underdevelopment" -- that is, stagnation, poverty, unemployment -- is not the 
natural state. Prior to their incorporation into the world capitalist system 
these socio-economic formations were undeveloped insofar as their productive 
forces were primitive. This, however, is quite different from the condition 
of underdevelopment as it is meant by dependency theory. Underdevelopment in 
this sense of the term denotes a dynamic process; a process which began 
centuries ago but which is still ongoing. In other words, while 
bourgeois-liberal ideology sees underdevelopment as the original state and a 
process taking place whose end result is capitalist development, the radical 
dependency school sees underdevelopment as a condition that is deepening and 
becoming more pervasive. Samir Amin describes it in the following way: 
What is worse is that this definition (liberal development 
theory) leads straight-away to an essential error: the 
underdeveloped countries are seen as being like the 
"developed" ones at an earlier stage of their development. 
In other words, the essential fact is left out, namely, 
that the underdeveloped countries form part of a world 
system, that the history of their integration into this 
system forged their special structure which thence 
forth has nothing in common with what prevailed before 
their integration into the modern world.20 
This process is subsumed in Frank's well-known phrase -- "the development 
of underdevelopment. " 21 The basics of this theory of underdevelopment and 
dependence argued by Baran, Frank, Amin, Rodney, 22 as well as many 
others -- are the same: 
Economic development and underdevelopment are the opposite 
sides of the same coin. Both are the necessary result and 
contemporary manifestation of internal contradictions in 
the world capitalist system •••• 0ne and the same historical 
process of the expansion and development of capitalism 
throughout the world has simultaneously generated -- and 
continues to generate -- both economic development (in the 
industrialized capitalist core states) and structural 
underdevelopment (in the dependent peripheral 
states).23 
This process of underdevelopment is seen to have begun gradually with 
European mercantile expansion beginning in what Wallerstein calls "the long 
sixteenth century" -- 1450-1640. 24 We do not intend here to discuss the 
Marxist debate concerning the transition from feudalism to capitalism -- that 
is, whether its central dynamic was the dissolution of feudal society due to 
contradictions internal to the feudal mode of production itself, or whether 
this transition was brought about by the "dissolving effects" of mercantile 
wealth infused into northwestern Europe and England, originally from the 
Mediterranean and then subsequently from the pillaging of Latin America, 
Africa and Asia.25 
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Suffice it to say here that large amounts of wealth were transferred from 
the constantly expanding area of newly incorporated regions to the coffers of 
Western Europe in the five centuries after 1450. Over a century ago, Marx 
noted the effect of mercantile capitalist expansion, both on the peripheral 
areas into which it expanded and on the metropolitan countries that reaped the 
proceeds of this expansion: 
and 
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extir-
pation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the 
aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and 
looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a 
warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signal-
ized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. 
These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of 
pr1m1.t1.ve accumulation .... The colonial system ripened, 
like a hot-house, trade and navigation. The "societies 
Monopolia" of Luther were powerful levers for concentration 
of capital. The colonies secured a market for the budding 
manufactures and, through the monopoly of the market, an 
increased accumulation. The treasures captured outside 
Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement, and murder, 
floated back to the mother-country and were turned into 
capital •••• Today industrial supremacy implies commercial 
supremacy. In the period of manufacture properly so-called 
it is, on the other hand, the commercial supremacy that 
gives industrial predominance •.•. Liverpool waxed fat on 
the slave-trade. This was its method of primitive 
accumulation •••• In fact, the veiled slavery of the wage 
workers in Europe needed for its pedestal, slavery pure 
and simple in the new world. 
In the same way, the expansion of foreign trade, although 
the basis of the capitalist mode of production in its 
infancy, has become its own product, however, with the 
further progress of the capitalist mode of production, 
through the innate necessity of this mode of production, 
its need for an ever-expanding market •... As concerns 
capitals invested in colonies, etc,; on the other hand, 
they may yield higher rates of profit for the simple 
reason that the rate of profit is higher there due to 
backward development, and likewise the exploitation of 
labor, because of the use of slaves, coolies, etc ...• Since 
the rate of profit is higher, therefore, because it is 
generally higher in colonial country, it may, provided 
natural conditions are favorable, go hand in hand with low 
commodity prices •••• This same foreign trade develops the 
capitalist mode of production in the home country ••• 26 
Thus, from Marx's point of view, Western Europe enriched itself by 
siphoning off enormous amounts of wealth from the newly incorporated regions 
but, more importantly, instead of simply consuming this plundered weal th as 
had previous imperial expansions, it turned this wealth into capital. From 
the point of view of dependency theory, this plundering not only contributed, 
on the one hand, to the development of European capitalism, but, on the other, 
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deprived the periphery of wealth that could have been turned to its own 
development. Thus, it set in motion the "development of underdevelopment" by 
gearing these peripheral socio-economic formations into the needs of 
metropolitan capital and creating a structural condition which prevented any 
other course than underdevelopment. It is this latter factor, not simply the 
initial plunder, that is crucial to the dependency argument. As Marx also 
pointed out in this regard, "They [European capital] also forcibly rooted out, 
in their dependent countries, all industry, as, e.g., England did with the 
Irish woolen manufacture. 1127 In a similar vein Ernest Mandel has noted: 
While capitalism has spread all over the world, the 
greater part of the world has experienced only its 
disintegrating effects without benefitting from its 
creative side. Indeed, the unlimited industrial advance 
of the Western world has been possible only at the expense 
of the so-called underdeveloped world, which has been 
doomed to stagnation and regression.28 
The above point by Marx regarding the conscious destruction of all 
indigenous industry that could serve to compete with expanding capitalism or 
act as a pole around which the economy of the area being penetrated could 
group, has been described numerous times for other areas. Rodney makes this 
point explicitly with regard to pre-colonial industry in West Africa. 29 
Baran, among many others, described the process by which the British 
systematically debilitated the Indian textile industry between 1780 and 
1850. 3o Mandel notes that in 1815, British textile exports to India were 
valued at only £26,000, while Britain consumed £1.3 million of Indian 
textiles. By 1850, the Indian textile industry had been destroyed and India 
imported 25 percent of all Lancashire's exports: 
This [India's underdevelopment] results from the fact that 
capitalism entered this country under conditions of 
imperialist domination, which transformed India from a 
producer of manufactured goods into a producer of 
agricultural raw materials. 31 
In the earlier period both raw and manufactured Bengali cotton and silk 
had been transported overland to Gujarati merchants and manufacturers but, 
because of British colonial pol icy, began to be exported to Europe. This 
disrupted Indian internal trade and "rendered indigenous merchant capital 
idle, forcing it to seek refuge in the acquisition of landed property. 1132 
Having destroyed the textile industry, the British switched from appropriating 
Indian production to controlling the Indian market for Lancashire production. 
The consequence was that "during the second half of the nineteenth century, 
the modern Indian landlord was created and an alliance was formed between him 
and imperialism. 11 33 
Thus, not only was the colonial world plundered, it was underdeveloped. 
Plunder, in its strict definition or in its more rapacious form, has not been 
the continuing mechanism for the transfer of value from the periphery to the 
core. Over the centuries the forms taken to bring about this transfer have 
changed as the needs of capital have changed. Thus, by the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century, one could distinguish three broadly different 
circumstances by which this transfer was effected. In Latin America, legally 
independent since early in the same century, the transfer was brought about on 
the basis of seeming equality; that is, between seemingly independent national 
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states. In places like India, the Caribbean, Indonesia, and Indochina value 
transfer was mediated through the colonial state which generally represented 
only latent force and under conditions of free wage labor. However, in 
Africa, except for the old coastal enclaves, the process was the same as it 
bad been two and three centuries earlier in Latin America; plunder and forced 
labor brought about by Europe's capacity to bring to bear superior force. By 
the end of World War II the mechanisms of control in Africa were similar to 
those utilized in India three-quarters of a century earlier. Within another 
two decades Africa, post-colonial Asia, and Latin America ( that is, those 
countries that had not undergone radical change) were all nominally 
independent but still subject to the transfer-out of value -- no longer by 
outright plunder and pillage or even the forced exchange with the colonial 
mother country, but indirectly through "free trade" and the mechanism of 
unequal exchange.33 
Although much of the social surplus is transferred out, some remains in 
the form of capital investments such as railroads, industrial plants, mines, 
and other forms of fixed investments. However, from the dependency 
perpecti ve, underdevelopment has much more pervasive features: it is the 
structure of the economic system and the type of capital accumulation that 
results which constitutes dependency and continuing underdevelopment; that is, 
the lack of an indigenously-oriented process of accumulation of self-expanding 
value. 
Dependent and underdeveloped economies are generally characterized by 
three structural features: 35 
(1) Unevenness of productivity between sectors. That is, that 
underdeveloped countries are characterized by relatively small, highly 
capitalized sectors on the one hand, and low productivity, backward 
agricultural sectors on the other. At the same time, the low productivity 
sectors are subordinated to the world market rather than existing 
independently as "traditional economies." These backward sectors articulate 
with the world market in two ways. Firstly, they produce primarily for the 
capitalist market (exchange values) and only secondarily for their own 
comsumption (use values). They are forced to sell the commodities produced 
by their labor in order to reproduce themselves. Their subsistence production 
is not sufficient to constitute ownership of their own means of reproduction. 
They are, as it were, semi-proletarianized. Secondly, they constitute in more 
classically Marxist terms, a reserve army of labor that serves to depress the 
wages of those working in the highly capitalized sector. Amin argues that in 
most of the Third World between 65 and 80 percent of the population is engaged 
in rural ariculture, while in those same countries agriculture constitutes 40 
percent or less of the GDP.36 
( 2) Disarticulation of the economic system. That is, that the various 
sectors of the economy have few if any intersectoral exchanges. Thus, 
agricultural production is geared into exports rather than for the nation I s 
food consumption requirements. Accordingly, countries with 80 percent of 
their population engaged in agricultural production are forced to import 
food. Raw materials are not produced for the consumption of indigenous 
industry but are instead exported. Indigenous industry, on the other hand, 
must import most of its capital goods and raw materials. 
(3) 
whether 
Domination from the 
agricultural, mining, 
outside. That 
or industrial 
is, that most 
is geared 
production 
to conditions 
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obtaining in the world capitalist system as a 
generally controls the decisive sectors of the 
decisions of Third World countries are generally 
owed debts and the constantly recurring need to 
financial dependence generally, Amin has written: 
whole. Foreign capital 
economy and the economic 
circumscribed by externally 
borrow further. Describing 
The fundamental cause of this is that investments of 
foreign capital in the underdeveloped countries 
automatically engender a flow of profit transfer in the 
opposite direction. With an average rate of return of 
twenty to twenty-five percent, the flow of profits back to 
the advanced countries soon exceeds the flow of capital 
investments •••• 37 
The local bourgeoisie that developed in the periphery in this process of 
capitalist penetration was not a "true bourgeoisie, 11 at least in the sense 
that it did not fulfill the same progressive historical function as had the 
European middle class in the first three centuries of the development of 
capitalism. This class did not accumulate, innovate and invest. Instead it 
functioned primarily as an agent of metropolitan capital to facilitate 
imperialist penetration. It is what Cabral has called: 
••• A pseudo-bourgeoisie, controlled by the ruling class of 
the dominating country ••• thus the local pseudo-
bourgeoisie, however strongly nationalist it may be, 
cannot effectively fulfill its historical function; it 
cannot freely direct the development of the productive 
forces; in brief it cannot be a nationalist 
bourgeoisie. 38 
Fanon referred to the historical mission of this class as being that of 
"intermediary": 
Seen through its eyes, its mission has nothing to do with 
transforming the nation; it consists, prosaically, of 
being the transmission line between the nation and a 
capitalism, rampant though camouflaged, which today puts 
on the masque of neo-colonialism ..• Because it is bereft of 
ideas, because it lives to itself and cuts itself off from 
the people, undermined by its hereditary incapacity to 
think in terms of all the problems of the nation and seen 
from the point of view of the whole of that nation, the 
national middle class will have nothing better to do than 
to take on the role of manager for Western enterprise, and 
it 'will in practice set up its country as the brothel of 
Europe.39 
Having developed a dependent relationship, this bourgeoisie was never able 
to operate independently; that is, as a bourgeoisie proper. The distorted 
structure of peripheral capitalism prevented this. Frank has argued regarding 
Latin America, that only on those occasions in which the metropoles were 
experiencing economic contraction, was an independent, nationalist bourgeoisie 
in the peripheral countries able to appear that had intentions of 
inward-directed capitalist development. However, as soon as the period of 
contraction ended and world capitalism began another period of expansion, this 
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nascent (true) bourgeois class was shunted aside either through the simple 
economic power of metropolitan capital and its local allies, or, on those 
occasions when it was necessary, through the use of force.40 
III. The Critics of Dependency Theory 
Just as dependency theory grew out of a dissatisfaction with the 
explanatory capacity of modernization theory, its radical critics see it as 
being incapable of explaining the new realities of the post-colonial world. 
In their attempts to explain such differences in levels of development as 
those, for example, between Brazil and Nicaragua or Zimbabwe and Nigeria, 
etc., they have focussed their attention of the historically specific ways in 
which internal class structures have articulated with imperialism and possible 
ways in which formal independence has altered these configurations. They have 
looked more closely at the ways in which local bourgeois classes have promoted 
their own interests through the use of state power. Finally they have 
re-opened the traditional Marxist debate discussed briefly in the introduction 
of attempting to find the locus of the transition from feudalism to capitalism 
in Western Europe which gave birth to an aggressive system of expansion and 
the role which the non-capitalist world played in this expansion. 
In these attacks the critics argue, inter alia, that dependency theory: 
1. fails to 
structures 
forces; 
take into account the internal class and 
of the periphery that inhibit development of the 
productive 
productive 
2. tends to focus attention on the metropoles and international capital 
( the existing international di vision of labor), as they are "blamed" 
for poverty, stagnation, and backwardness, instead of on local class 
formation. This misdirects political activity, producing pessimism 
and political complacency on the part of actual or potential 
revolutionary classes;4 1 
3. fails to differentiate 
pre-capitalist) modes of 
appropriating the surplus; 
capitalist 
controlling 
from feudal (or other 
the direct producer and 
4. ignores the productivity of labor as the central point in economic 
development and thus locates the motor force of capitalist development 
and underdevelopment in the transfer of the economic surplus from the 
periphery to the core. This not only distorts history but Marxist 
theory as well; 
5. encourages a "third-worldist" ideology that undermines the potential 
for international working class solidarity by lumping together as 
"enemies" both the metropolitan bourgeoisie and working class; 
6. holds out the "utopia" of autarky instead of socialism; 
7. is static, in that it is unable to explain and account for changes in 
underdeveloped economies over time; 
8. holds that industrialization and thus "development" cannot take place 
in the Third World, in the face of growing evidence to the contrary; 
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9. forecloses the possibility that an independent, indigenous bourgeoisie 
involved in the sphere of production and the accumulation of capital 
locally can develop. 
While many of the above-listed criticisms overlap, it seems that most of 
the substantial criticisms of dependency theory are covered. For the purpose 
of discussion, these can be divided into two broad areas; theoretical and 
empirical. In the former we would include the first six of the above; the 
last three being empirical objections.42 
It does seem accurate to say that early dependency writing tended to view 
underdevelopment in a mechanical and undifferentiated way. The entire world 
was divided into two categories the core industrialized capitalist 
countries of Western Europe and North America and the peripheral countries of 
the rest of the world. (The socialist countries, of course, were excepted 
from this scheme.) 
In a similar way, the term "Third World," which has been used throughout 
this paper, has little specific explanatory value. It is a term whose origins 
lie in the early Cold War period and was used to refer to all those countries 
not considered directly a part of the two great Cold War factions the 
industrialized capitalist countries and the socialist industrial cuntries. 
All those other nations tended to be poor, to have a low level of productive 
forces, and to have a work force involved primarily in agricultural 
production. Clearly, this kind of a residual typology falls very short of any 
kind of an accurate description of what this enormous and quite differentiated 
mass of countries is like. Thus, to include in the same category Brazil with 
a population of nearly 120 million and 3.3 million square miles of territory 
and, for example, Tuvalu which consists of 9.8 square miles and a population 
of 10,000, is clearly approaching absurdity. 
Accordingly, dependency theory tended to ignore the vast differences 
existing between underdeveloped countries. An attempt to deal with this 
failing has been the concept of semi-periphery. Dependency theory, parti-
cularly in the work of Frank, with his concept of a chain of exploitation 
beginning in the financial centers of world capitalism and extending all the 
way to a Bolivian peasant, blurred the differences that should be made between 
geographical relationships and class relationships. Thus, the relations of 
exploitation existing between, say, the United States and Brazil as national 
states were seen to be the same as those existing between General Motors and 
its workers as well as between a Brazilian landowner and the peasants who 
worked on his land. 
However, despite some of these deficiencies, the purpose of the radical 
dependency model was to develop an explanation as to why, for example, Chile 
and Brazil after a century and a half of independence were still largely poor, 
underdeveloped, and satellites of Western capital. That is to say, it 
attempted to explain why neither the Marx of The Communist Manifesto nor 
bourgeois development theory had been proven correct, not only in Brazil and 
Chile, but in most of the rest of the world. 
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A. The Theoretical Critique 
What we have labelled the "theoretical" criticism of dependency theory is, 
as mentioned above, closely associated with the so-called "articulation 
debate" -- i.e., the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Most of the 
radical dependency school have argued that the expansion of European merchant 
capital, beginning in the sixteenth century, set in motion the 
"underdevelopment" of Latin America; and then subsequently Asia and Africa. 
This was brought about through a systematic transfer out of the social surplus 
of these newly incorporated countries, contributing to the further development 
of the core capitalist countries of Europe and later North America. This 
out-transfer of the economic surplus has continued until the present with the 
result of further underdevelopment, on the one hand, and further development 
in the core countries on the other. 
This view, the critics argue, mislocates the dynamic of capital accumu-
lation which is properly situated in the separation of the direct producers 
( the peasants) from the means of production ( the land). This separation 
(primitive accumulation) is the result of class struggle internal to the 
feudal mode of production; that is, the inability of the landlords to increase 
feudal rent in the face of peasant resistance and ultimately the gaining of 
freedom by the peasants from feudal dues altogether. The result of this 
struggle was the appearance of free labor that is, labor power as a 
commodity. This appearance of labor power in commodity form allowed (forced) 
it to be purchased by capital, breaking the resistance inherent in feudal 
production to technical innovation that could increase the productivity of 
labor. It allowed the productivity of labor to be increased relatively rather 
than absolutely and in turn brought about the vast expansion of commodity 
production characteristic of the capitalist epoch -- development! 
In the words of Robert Brenner, "It is the question of the transformation 
of class relations and whether or not they are favorable or unfavorable to the 
development of the productive forces which becomes the central question in 
analyzing economic development and underdevelopment. 1143 In this view, 
dependency theory is manifestly incorrect in maintaining that underdevelopment 
in the periphery is brought about by a transfer of surplus to the core which 
facilitates the core's development. On the contrary, underdevelopment is 
caused by class relations in the periphery that fetter the development of the 
productive forces by preventing the complete emergence of free labor power as 
a commodity. Thus, it is the persistence of feudal (or other pre-capitalist) 
class relations that have inhibited development in Latin Arnerica. 44 
It is this aspect of underdevelopment -- the 
existing in the peripheral economies that inhibit 
dency theory allegedly ignores. Frank, for one, 
this criticism: 
nature of the class forces 
development -- that depen-
has specifically addressed 
It is more important to define and to understand under-
development in terms of classes. However, ... under-
development in a dependent region such as Latin America 
cannot be understood except as the product of a bourgeois 
policy formulated in response to class interests and class 
structure, which are in turn determined by the dependence 
of the Latin American satellite on the colonialist, 
imperialist metropolis. 
and: 
It must be said that ••• dependence should not and cannot be 
considered a purely "external" relationship imposed on 
Latin Americans from abroad against their wishes. 
Dependence is also, and in equal measure, an "internal," 
integral element of Latin American society. The dominant 
bourgeoisie in Latin America accepts dependence consciously 
and willingly but is nevertheless molded by it. If 
dependence were purely "external, 11 it could be argued that 
objective conditions exist which would permit the 
"national" bourgeoisie to propose a "nationalist" or 
"autonomous" solution to the problem of underdevelopment. 
But in our view, such a solution does not exist •..• 45 
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A similar analysis is emphasized in Frank's discussion of "Who is the 
Immediate Enemy? 1146 
The brilliant Guinean revolutionary theorist, Amilcar Cabral, makes much 
the same point when he argues that the principal contradiction facing the 
underdeveloped world is the struggle against neo-colonialism which he defines 
as "rationalized imperialism" or imperialism's indirect domination maintained 
through a class of "native agents. 1147 Cabral makes it plain that 
"internal" and "external" factors inhibiting progress do not exist 
independently of each other; that even after the national flag is raised this 
dual struggle must go on - thus, the slogan of revolutionary Lusophone Africa 
a luta continua. 
The political result of the dependency view, the critics say, is to turn 
attention away from the internal class relations of any particular under-
developed country and focus it on the metropoles which are held responsible 
for existing poverty. This gives rise to a "third worldist" ideology which 
locates the struggle on an international plane of the underdeveloped world 
against the metropoles (which includes the metropolitan working class as they 
also benefit from the transfer of surplus) rather than that of a struggle of 
all the world's proletarians and peasants against the bourgeoisie, whether it 
be metropolitan or peripheral. Given the analytical schema, which states that 
incorporation into the capitalist world system necessitates underdevelopment, 
Brenner (as well as others) argues, 11 ••• the logical antidote to capitalist 
underdevelopment is not socialism, but autarky. 114~ 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, we do not intend to go at length into 
the "articulation" debate. The dependency critics argue that Marx was 
indisputably clear about what he saw as indispensable to the development of 
capitalism; that is, the appearance of free labor power as a commodity. In 
the first line of Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, Marx writes: "One of 
the prerequisites of wage labour and one of the historic conditions for 
capital is free labour and the exchange of free labour against 
1149 
money•••• However, later in the same work Marx also writes, in 
discussing the dissolution of pre-capitalist forms: 
The process of dissolution which turns a mass of 
individuals into a nation etc., into potential free wage 
labourers does not presuppose the disappearance of the 
previous sources of income or (in part) of the previous 
conditions of property of these individuals. On the 
contrary, it assumes that only their use has been altered, 
that their mode of existence has been transferred .••• 50 
14 
For Marx, it seems, it was not simply the outward forms of labor control 
but also the underlying relationship to the dominnant mode of production that 
had to be considered. Thus, Laclau' s supposed refutation of the dependency 
thesis 51 simply because Latin America failed to reflect the appearance of 
free labor power as the dominant form, seems to be rather mechanical reading 
of Marx or what Petras calls " ••• dogmatic Marxist fundamentalists who spend 
most of their time counting the number of modes of production in a social 
formation." 52 This imposition on the Third World of the particular 
historical circumstances surrounding the rise of capitalism in Europe seems 
manifestly incorrect. Does the simple existence of non-wage payments (for 
example, to African migrant workers or South African miners) preclude the 
existence of capitalism? The rather crude argument that makes wage-labor the 
single defining element of capitalism everywhere seems deficient and " .. . an 
error of historical proportions. 1153 A more adequate and comprehensive 
definition would seem to be that used by Petras: 
The process of bringing together labor, capital, and 
machinery to produce surplus value defines the capitalist 
mode of production, not the particular forms within which 
the relations of production are organized.54 
Regarding the "motor force" behind the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism, it seems much more accurate to say that Marx saw two factors -- an 
internally-generated primitive accumulation resulting from class conflict and 
a trade-created externally-accumulated surplus as having a symbiotic 
relationship. That is to say, they interacted with each other in the genesis 
and development of the capitalist mode of production. Clearly, Marx attached 
great importance to the expansion of trade after the beginning of the 
sixteenth century. Likewise, it seems indisputable that over the last five 
centuries an enormous surplus has been transferred out of what is today called 
the periphery. Even Brenner, one of the dependency school's strongest 
critics, is forced to concede this.55 
It is, it seems to us, a question of necessary and sufficient causes. 
Neither was sufficient in isolation, but both were necessary in combination. 
Marx argued that "the expansion of foreign trade, although the basis of the 
capitalist mode of production in its infancy, has become its own product; 
however, with the further progress of the capitalist mode of production, 
through the innate necessity of this mode of production, its need for an 
ever-expanding market" 56 (our italics). From his early writings to those 
that were not published until after his death, Marx seems to have made this 
point clear. In The German Ideology he wrote: "Trade and manufacture created 
the big bourgeoisie." He similarly noted that both accelerated the 
accumulation of movable capital and that both brought about the dissolution of 
the feudal community. 57 It was Marx's contention that production and 
commerce had a reciprocal relationship. Only when commerce had secured a 
world market for large-scale production was "the permanence of the acquired 
productive forces assured." The impetus for the expansion of the textile 
industry was provided by commercial capital which, "wrenched it out of the 
form of production hitherto existing."58 
Marx, time and again, refers to the extension of commerce consequent upon 
the discovery of America and the sea route to the East Indies as bringing into 
Europe new products, including gold and silver and completely changing 
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existing class relationships which dealt destructive blows to feudal 
property. The demand created by this new world market was instrumental in 
calling large-scale industry into existence. 59 
In a similar way, Marx describes the effect of money accumulated through 
usury and mercantile profits. This wealth in money form he describes as being 
a prerequisite for capital; in fact, it is money capital accumulated in this 
way that turns into industrial capita1. 60 
Marx was certainly not unwilling to refer to enterprises as capitalist 
that had been created in the periphery as a result of European expansion, 
despite the fact that they organized their labor force using pre-capitalist 
fonns. In his mind, the existence of these forms was simply an anomaly: 
If we now talk of plantation owners in America as 
capitalists, if they are capitalists, this is due to the 
fact that they exist as anomalies within a world market 
based upon free labour. 61 
An anomaly these forms clearly were and, insofar as they continue today, still 
are. However, their anomalous existence notwithstanding, to refer to a social 
formation exhibiting these forms of labor control as feudal in an epoch in 
which the dominant form of production is capitalist seems to us to be an 
egregious analytical error. 
Furthermore, Marx argued that colonial investment yielded higher rates of 
profit because "the rate of profit is higher there due to the backward 
development, and likewise the exploitation of labor, because of the use of 
slaves, coolies, etc. 1162 Clearly, from Marx's point of view, the use of 
"slaves and coolies" not only did not prevent capital accumulation, albeit in 
the metropole, but actually enhanced it. In other words, accumulation was 
greater because of circumstances that allowed the exploitation of unfree (not 
fully proletarianized) labor, not despite it. A few lines later, Marx posits 
a theory of unequal exchange so integral to the dependency school, when he 
says, "The favored country recovers more labour in exchange for less labour, 
although this difference, this excess is pocketed, as in any exchange between 
labour and capital, by a certain class. 11 Marx follows this with a statement 
that could have been written by any post-war dependency theorist, "This same 
foreign trade develops the capitalist mode of production in the home 
country ••• n63 Marx goes on to say that in the long run, this foreign 
trade has the opposite effect because it promotes overproduction in relation 
to the capacity of the foreign markets to consume. However, no radical 
dependency theorist, so far as we know, has argued that capitalism is not 
fraught with contradictions that will eventually bring about its demise. 
Marx is quoted here so extensively because it is with his work and based 
upon his authority that some writers have bludgeoned dependency theory. The 
use by these writers of Marx's authority to claim that capital accumulation on 
an extended scale could not take place in a condition not characterized by 
fully proletarianized labor 64 is refuted by the fact that Marx saw foreign 
trade, colonial investment, and the use of "slave and coolie" labor as one of 
the specific ways in which capital attempted to arrest the falling tendency of 
the rate of profit and thus extend the accumulation process. 65 
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The criticism leveled at the dependency school that it advocated "autarky" 
instead of "socialism" seems to be simply incorrect. Even a cursory glance at 
the writings of the radical dependency school should be sufficient to point 
out this fact. Frank, for example, has, on numerous occasions, pointed to the 
Cuban example as being one in which the relations of dependency that had 
characterized pre-revolutionary Cuba were being broken. (Brenner would 
presumably respond that Cuba is an example of what he calls "the strategy of 
semi-autarkic socialist development" and "the utopia of socialism in one 
country."66) 
Dieter Senghaas, a West German specialist on economic development, has 
argued persuasively in a series of articles that all real economic development 
has been what he calls "autocentric. " 67 Senghaas notes that England alone 
developed an industrial economy in an atmosphere free of more advanced 
industrial states. In a discussion of the theories of the nineteenth century 
. . . . d . h . 68 German political economist, Frie ric List, Senghaas writes: 
List's cr1t1c1sm of the world-wide free-trade system 
advocated especially by Britain ••• was based on practical 
observations and the systematic deduction that within such 
a tiered, asymmetrically structured world market system 
(that is, England at the top of the hierarchy, with 
Germany, France, and the USA on the second tier -- the 
authors) the less developed society must necessarily get 
the worst of it in the long-run. Without protectionist 
measures, the second-tier societies could not check the 
flooding of their markets with cheap manufactured goods 
from the more advanced British industry; the ruin of 
emerging industrial societies was progrannned into a free-
trade system with unequally developed productivity 
levels. 69-
Senghaas goes on to argue that this policy of semi-autarky has been and is 
being followed by every industrialized and industrializing state from the 
mid-nineteenth century to the present; from protective tariffs and the German 
Zoll verein to autocentric Soviet economic policy after 1917, to the post-war 
policies of socialist Korea and China. Senghaas' contention is that 
autocentric development policies are critical during the early stages of 
industrialization and that, after a certain level of internal coherence and 
income distribution is created, any particular socio-economic formation can 
afford, without the concomitant negative of "underdeveloping" effects, to 
participate more fully and with a semblance of equality in the international 
trading system. 
As all students of American economic history will know, it was with 
protectionism and 11autocentric 11 development that Alexander Hamilton concerned 
himself much of the time in his contributions to the Federalist Papers. 
Later, when Hamilton, as the first U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, was in 
charge of the country's economic policy, he in fact put into operation a 
program designed precisely to bring about that kind of development. 
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B. The Empirical Critique 
As mentioned earlier, it is difficult, if not impossible, to divide the 
radical critiques of dependency theory into two strictly delineated categories. 
Similarly, what we have listed as the nine most common criticisms are ofter 
merely different aspects of the same criticism and the list, thus, tends to a 
certain degree of repetitiveness. 
For example, Bill Warren's attack 
11empirical 11 category because his argument 
of statistics which purport to show that: 
on the dependency school is in the 
is based almost completely on a mass 
Empirical observations suggest that the prospects for 
successful capitalist development (implying industria-
lization) of a significant number of major underdeveloped 
countries are quite good; that substantial progress in 
capitalist industrialization has already been achieved; 
that the period since the Second World War has been marked 
by a major upsurge in capitalist social relations and 
productive forces (especially industrialization) in the 
Third World •••• 
At the same time, Warren's argument reflects point number one above (the lack 
of class analysis in the dependency model) when he writes: 
Insofar as there are obstacles to this (capitalist) 
development, they originate not in current imperialist-
Third World relationships, but almost entirely from the 
internal contradictions of the Third World itself. 70 
Warren's use of the word "current" to describe this relationship would 
seem a serious misreading of the dependency argument, since what is crucial to 
the dependency view is the fact that these relationships, and the consequent 
class structures, are the result of a long historical process. Warren seems 
to insist on some sort of a monocausal view; that is, that the obstacle to 
development must be either imperialism or internal contradictions. It cannot 
be both. Thus, he seems to be unable to conceptualize the point that the 
process of incorporating the periphery over a period of four centuries 
implanted, created, or facilitated the growth of certain class structures 
(internal contradictions) that then symbiotically interacted with imperialism 
(external structures) 71 in accordance with the changing needs over time of 
both the metropolitan and peripheral bourgeoisie. 
Thus, while some of the early dependency writings have tended to be 
"overly schematic" or mechanical in the way in which the satellite-metropolis 
relationship was described, it comes close to being a purposeful distortion of 
the theory to attack it as though its advocates were somehow arguing that the 
relationship has not changed from the Conquistadore-Inca relationship in the 
sixteenth century to the present one of, say, Volkswagen using cheap labor in 
Brazil to produce automobile engines for export to the United States. 
Nicola Swainson, among others, makes a similar distortion of the argument 
when she insists that the dependency concept is simply one of the core 
importing raw materials from the periphery and, in turn, exporting luxuries to 
the periphery. 72 Many who would be classified as part of the dependency 
school have made the exact opposite point. While they more or less agree that 
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the "dependent" nature of the relationship has been maintained over several 
centuries, the way in which this dependency has manifested itself has changed 
radically. 
In the early period it was simple plunder being replaced, at different 
times and depending upon geographical specificity, by the production of 
agricultural products and then other raw materials for metropolitan consump-
tion with the periphery allowing the market for these manufactured goods to 
expand quantitatively as it was at the same time expanding qualitatively in 
the core. In the post-war period, the manufacturing process itself (at least 
certain sectors of it) has been moving to the periphery, allowing the form of 
domination to be the control of technology rather than that of the production 
process itself. 73 As Raul Fernandez has pointed out, "the key industries 
can and do vary from time to time. 1174 In noting that steel production no 
longer has the central importance it once had, Fernandez quotes the president 
of Mexico's state-owned Sidermex as remarking: "Steel is really a nineteenth 
century activity. That's why you see the developed world falling back and the 
developing world moving into it. 1175 
A failure in emphasis in much of the dependency literature, it seems to 
us, is the tendency to dismiss the fact of independence as being simply 
inconsequential ( that is, according to Amin, unless there is an immediate 
transition to socialism). 76 In part, this has been an understandable 
reaction to Latin American history that has seen the reality of formal 
independence vitiated by of a continuing process of underdevelopment. 
Although much of the post-1945 experience in Africa and Asia has tended to 
corroborate this view, certain geopolitical circumstances, beginning with the 
October Revolution, have to some extent circumscribed the freedom with which 
the imperialist powers can act. Warren argues, correctly, we think, that: 
The term "neo-colonialism, 11 although possessing certain 
merits in stressing the continuance of imperialist 
domination and exploitation, is thus misleading insofar as 
it obscures the new and dynamic elements in the situation, 
both as to causes--concerning the role played by the 
achievement of formal sovereignty itself--and as to its 
effects. 77 
However, Warren goes on to say: 
Formal political independence 
countries a degree of manoeuvre and 
time, must inevitably come into 
conducive to economic advance.78 
gives underdeveloped 
initiative which over 
play, and which is 
One feels compelled to ask, how much time? It would seem that the Latin 
American experience -- or that of Ethiopia and Liberia, or China before the 
revolution, or Turkey -- clearly calls into question the inevitability of 
Warren's assertion. 
On the other hand, one would have to ask what Warren means by economic 
advance. He specifically states that he will not "discuss the most immediate 
problem which underdeveloped countries fact today: the backwardness of their 
agriculture and its consequences: the unevenness and imbalance of their 
economies. 1179 The refusal to discuss these aspects particularly that 
of agriculture -- would seem to be a critical omission, particularly in light 
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of that absolutely crucial role played by the rationalization of agricultural 
production in the "economic advance" of Western Europe. Having, in this 
manner, blithely passed over the factors of backward agriculture and uneven 
and imbalanced economies, Warren goes on to assert that, "indeed, 'stagnation' 
in the Third World is largely a myth. There has been very substantial growth 
of capitalist social relations of production throughout the Third 
World ••• "80 
Warren defines (tautologically) what he means by capitalist development: 
(It) is here understood as that development which provides 
the appropriate economic, social and political conditions 
for the continuing reproduction of capital, as a social 
system representing the highest form of commodity 
production. 81 
At the same time, just two sentences later, Warren dismisses the importance of 
"the adequacy of development as a process satisfying the needs of the 
masses. 
1182 Having dismissed "adequacy" of development; the "needs" of the 
masses; acknowledged the backwardness of agriculture and the uneven and 
imbalanced economies; Warren then asserts that capitalist developemnt is 
taking place. This argument is then buttressed by masses of statistics which 
purport to refute the dependency argument. Warren makes no attempt to clarify 
the nature of the capitalist development he claims is taking place, but what 
he seems to mean is that there has been a marked increase in the number (not 
only absolute but also relative) of fully proletarianized wage workers in the 
Third World. So what! 
Warren's statistics, methodology, and conse&uent interpretation of 
data have been attacked on several occasions. 8 Fernandez has noted 
following about this alleged spurt of Third World industrialization: 84 
his 
the 
(1) it has been largely limited to about a half-dozen countries and thus 
shows no clear-cut trend toward Third World industrialization overall; 
(2) much of it is of the "assembly" type; 
(3) it has seen the terms of trade for industrial exports deteriorate 
faster than for primary products, thus doing nothing to alleviate enormous 
debt problems; 
(4) it has maintained an export pattern that has primarily remained 
within the sphere of influence of the metropolitan countries; 
(5) it has not changed the reality that Third World exports fluctuate 
between 0.5 and 2.0 percent of total world-wide manufactured exports. 
For example, about half of the Third World's manufactured exports come 
from onlY. four countries South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore. 85 The vast bulk of Third World industrial production is in 
cheap consumer goods such as processed foods, textiles, clothing, footwear, 
luggage and electrical goods. 86 Along with the above-mentioned four 
countries, Brazil, Mexico and India produce most of the rest of the Third 
World's industrial exports. Already the effect of these cheap exports is 
having an impact which is producing resistance to their capacity to grow 
significantly in the future. These goods, on the one hand, tend to flood the 
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markets of other Third World countries, inhibiting or destroying their 
attempts to industrialize; on the other hand, they threaten older, less 
efficient industries in the metropoles. The consequence of these is a sharp 
rise in protectionist pressures.87 
The attraction for international capital to produce in the Third World is 
the virtually unlimited supply of cheap labor available there, and the fact 
that in many sectors, production in western Europe and North America is simply 
no longer as profitable as it is in the underdeveloped world. 88 This is 
due primarily to the high wages paid to workers in the industrialized world --
high wages brought about through past class struggles. However, the workers 
in the metropolitan countries cannot be ex11ected to sit idly by and watch 
their jobs be exported to low wage countries. 59 
Between 1973 and 1977, the growth rate of developing countries' exports 
has declined from 6. 4 percent to 3. 6 percent annually, and a decline in the 
terms of trade for these exports has "more than offset the growth in their 
export volume, resulting in a decline in the purchasing power of their 
exports • .,go As Abellatif Benachenhou has noted: "But the stagnation of 
the developed capitalist economies and the consequent protectionism have 
exposed the commercial fragility of these export-oriented industries." 91 
What Warren and others like him have done is to mistake a short-run expansion 
of industrial production for a long-term trend that already seems to be 
running out of steam. 
The import substitution strategy for industrial development was the one 
followed in the early post-war period until, in the mid-sixties, its failure 
became manifest. Instead of importing consumer goods, the countries pursuing 
this strategy imported machinery, spare parts, and other capital goods from 
the industrialized countries. Most of these imports were financed by an 
ever-growing mountain of foreign debt. Limited by an extremely narrow 
internal market, these industries tended to produce, instead of mass 
consumption items geared toward a broad internal market such as existed in the 
metropoles, more or less luxury items for a thin middle and upper class. In 
the words of Fernandez: "In the end, the Latin American countries were far 
deeper in debt, and a greater portion of their resources had to go to service 
debts and remit profits of foreign investors. n9Z 
The result was that the internal markets soon reached the saturation 
point. With the failure of import substitution, the next strategy was to 
pursue "growth" through an export-oriented strategy that clearly already seems 
to have reached its peak in the early seventies, as shown, for example, by 
numerous World Bank figures. 
The argument of Warren et al, that a massive technology transfer will 
accompany this rapid industrialization is simply not borne out by the facts. 
In high technology fields such as petrochemicals, motor vehicles, precision 
machine tools, and computers, there has been little or no transfer. As the 
World Bank has noted: "Developing countries still depend heavily on 
industrialized nations for new industrial processes and techniques . 11 The Bank 
estimates that 95 percent of all money spent on research and development is 
spent in the already industrialized world.93 
Thus, what has been pictured by some as "capitalist development" seems 
more and more to be "capitalist underdevelopment." The industrialization of 
the Third World has been accompanied by a massive debt burden, rising 
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unemployment, continuing agricultural stagnation, inflation, and enonnous 
poverty and suffering. 
Brazil's Wirtschaftswunder, which has been held up as a model for Third 
World development, has been showing cracks for several years. It, like most 
of the rest of the Third world's "economic miracles" was forced to borrow 
heavily in order to finance its industrialization. Brazil currently has an 
external public debt of $56 billion and is expected to have to borrow another 
$16 billion in 1981. 94 Its debt service ratio is over 60 percent and the 
cost of its imports jumped 50 percent in 1980 to go along with an inflation 
rate of 110 percent. After subtracting last year's oil import costs and 
foreign debt payments, much of which is owed to American banks (Brazil 
accounted for more than 10 percent of the earnings of Citibank and Chase 
Manhattan last year, the world's second and third largest banks) Brazilian 
President Fi~ueiredo noted that the country "has nothing left over for 
development!" 5 In global terms, the level of Third World indebtedness has 
reached such proportions that more and more Western banks now seem openly 
reluctant to reschedule debts. 96 
At the same time,the real wages for the mass of workers in Brazil, as in 
similar countries, has been drastically cut to about 45 percent of their 1964 
levels -- the year the generals came to power, 97 As the Brazilian workers 
and peasants have seen their economic conditions deteriorate drastically, they 
have also seen their political rights eliminated under the oppressive heel of 
an authoritarian, corporatist state -- a condition characteristic of all the 
other so-called rapidly developing capitalist countries. 
To repeat, then, dependency theory does not argue that the last five 
centuries have not been characterized by the advance of capitalist development, 
What has been under debate, however, has been the question as to the nature of 
this capitalist development. The argument is not that capitalist development 
has been "adequate" for the working class in the metropolitan countries, but 
that it has never in the past, is not doing so now, and seems incapable in the 
future of providing for Third World workers even that level of subsistence 
available presently to the North American and Western European working class. 
Simply measuring the extent of proletarianization in the Third World does not, 
to us, refute the dependency argument. 
Warren, as mentioned earlier, is one of the critics who merely attempts to 
measure the extent of proletarianizaton; that is, employed wage labor. He 
suggests that, "Some of the new ruling groups are showing signs of an ability 
and will to utilize the new economic and· political conditions, to begin to 
restructure their eocnomies along lines more suited to a successful indigenous 
capitalism, less subordinated to the needs of the imperialist 
countries. 1198 Peru, Zambia, and Nigeria are cited by Warren as three 
among many examples. The nationalist military officers governing Peru since 
1968 (the new ruling group to which Warren refers) were overthrown by a more 
"orthodox" military clique within a few years. When the military withdrew 
from power in July, 1980 in favor of a civilian government supported by the 
officer class, it was succeeded by Fernando Belaunde, the same person 
overthrown by Warren I s "new ruling group" twelve years earlier. Plus xa 
change, plus c'est xa meme chose. Since then, under what many Peruvians are 
calling the "Chicago boys" in deference to Milton Friedman, food and gasoline 
subsidies have been eliminated along with protective tariffs and a 17,5 
percent tax on domestic and foreign sales. At the same time the government 
has begun selling off nationalized industries to private investors while 
simultaneously raising 
impossible, for local 
participate.99 
interest rates 
interests to 
that make 
borrow the 
it difficult, if 
necessary capital 
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not 
to 
The result will be that the weaker Peruvian industrial sector, which 
benefitted from the former policies will be overwhelmed by imported goods from 
the United States, Western Europe and Japan. Unemployment in a country that 
even now has only four out of every ten members of its work force in stable 
employment is expected to rise. Even that paragon of capitalism and free 
trade, Business Week, has written, "Predictably, the poor have been the 
hardest hit by the free market policies. Since the food subsidies were lifted 
in January (1981), the prices of such essentials as bread, milk and sugar have 
risen by more than 60 percent in that month alone."lOO 
Zambia' a economy has been a well-known disaster area for many years, and 
hardly exhibits a "ruling group" capable of anything more than deepening the 
disaster and increasing its dependence on South Africa and, through the 
apartheid state, on Western capital in general. A recent study has 
characterized the Nigerian economy as "drone capitalism"lOl and concluded 
that, "The Nigerian road to development has been and remains an unambiguously 
dependent capitalist one. 102 
Swainson' s argument attempts a more sophisticated approach. Where 
Warren's thesis depended primarily upon a simple quantitative increase 1.n 
manufacturng employment and production, Swainson attempts to prove that an 
indigenous and independent national bourgeoisie is developing in Kenya. She 
emphasizes the role of the Kenya bourgeoisie and its capacity to use the post 
colonial state to further its own accumulation, often in competition with 
metropolitan capital. Her argument hinges on the fact that this local 
capitalist class, after accumulating some capital through commercial 
activities, agricultureb and land speculation, has begun slowly to enter the 
sphere of production. 1 3 Her own figures, however, indicate the backward 
nature of this activity. The only activity in which African companies 
predominate is in agricultural production and distribution. What manufac-
turing they are involved in is food and clothing. l04 Unless one expects 
another textile-industry-based take-off a la eighteenth century England, the 
outlook for indigenous capitalism in Kenya looks decidedly grim. 
While Swainson spends a substantial portion of her work allegedly refuting 
dependency theory, she is forced to conclude: "However, this type of 
indigenous capitalism is obviously not operating independently of the 
international capitalist system. Nor does the localization of productive 
capital which is beginning in Kenya, portend any kind of autonomous capitalist 
development. ulOS Faithful to the end to her political position, if not to 
the facts she herself has presented, Swainson finds if necessary again to 
misrepresent the model she has decided to attack by suggesting a few lines 
later that, "The constant emphasis by radicals and the petty bourgeoisie on 
identifying the principal contradiction as imperialism operating from outside 
the social formation is a prescription for political complacency. For if the 
specifics of class formation are lost, then so is political strategy. 11106 
Probably the best response to Swains on' s rather self-serving comment was 
provided by the editors of the journal in which her article appeared, who 
noted wryly: 
Here it is worth saying as a preface that political sense 
is not automatically a monopoly of those whose analysis is 
more theoretically consistent or closest to the purity of 
the original Marx. Thus, Gunder Frank, whose first 
analysis is now routinely attacked for the simplicity of 
its metropolis-satellite picture, was not using this model 
to argue for backing the national ruling class but to urge 
the need for an immediate struggle for socialism in 
circumstances where there would be no bourgeois democratic 
revolution. Nothing in the evidence of Swainson and 
Kennedy leads us to reject Frank's important proposition 
that an independent national capitalist development is 
just not on. 107 
Conclusion 
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Radical criticisms of the dependency model have correctly served to focus 
attention on its inadequacies, particularly those of the early dependency 
writings. Thus, in order to understand and develop a proper strategy for 
anti-imperialist political activity, one must, for example, have an under-
standing of the class relationships of any particular peripheral social 
formation and the ways in which these structures articulate with international 
capital on the one hand, and the producing classes in the underdeveloped world 
on the other. To dismiss Third World ruling classes, for example, as mere 
puppets whose interests are always mechanically synonomous with those of 
metropolitan interests is to ignore the realities of a relationship much more 
complex than that. The very unevenness and contradictory nature of the 
capitalist development process necessarily produces a constantly changing 
relationship. 
Likewise, it would be very inappropriate to look at the so-called Third 
World as an undifferentiated and equally dependent mass of countries. These 
countries already differed vastly from one another in terms of their 
individual histories and cultures, size of their populations, natural 
resources, etc. several decades ago when the rather simplistic term "Third 
World" was coined. Since then, a deepening of these differences has occurred 
to the extent that the terms fourth and fifth world have been used by some to 
give recognition to this fact. The countries of the periphery thus have not 
remained static but have followed their own specific historical paths. Some 
have experienced socialist revolution while others, which have remained within 
the capitalist system, are now considered semi-industrialized. 
What this paper has attempted to show is that what is commonly referred to 
as dependency theory does not need to be, and in fact is not, incompatible 
with these developments. Its great contribution has been to focus attention 
on the way in which the periphery articulates with the core capitalist 
countries and on the way in which this articulation affects economic and 
political conditions in the periphery. It has pointed to the importance of 
core/periphery over the past several centuries and the way in which these have 
affected internal class configurations in the periphery. Thus, while the 
critics concentrate on internal class relations, dependency theory tends to 
concentrate on the way in which a country as a whole and its ruling class 
articulates with international capital. We agree with those who argue that a 
synthesis of the two is both possible and necessary. In fact, the two are 
complementary. 
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Finally, the most incorrect and, we think, dangerous misinterpretation is 
that which ascribes a political position advocating pessimism and complacency 
to those who identify imperialism as the primary obstacle to Third World 
liberation and progress. Whatever one may think of the analysis, for example, 
of the Sandanistas one can hardly accuse them of policical passivity. It was 
their contention that the Samoza regime was maintained in power by American 
imperialism. Recent Nicaraguan history, for example, gives short shrift to 
the passivity argument as is underlined by Ernesto Cardenal, the Nicaraguan 
poet and revolutionary in a poem directed specifically against US imperialism: 
NATIONAL SONG FOR NICARAGUA 
To invest capital in Nacaragua and, once invested, 
to protect it was the role of the State Department. 
Political expansion with reference to economic expansion 
and economic expansion because capital was insufficiently 
productive in the United States or less productive 
than in Nicaragua. 
That is: Imperialism 
intervention for investments or vice versa. 
Diplomacy subjugated the country via the banks 
the banks enriched themselve via diplomacy. 
United, in their evening suits, the dark vultures 
around the Gross National Product. 
Like the shark, once it has smelled the blood. 
Foreign intervention was favored by 
disorganization and corrupution in the country 
thus it happened that intervention favored and promoted 
disorganization and corruption (as clearly as a bird's eye) 
Thus: 
Imperialism as an interference factor, as disorganization, 
underdevelopment, corruption in Nicaragua has violated 
and desecrated contracts, constitutions, legal rulings 
has kindled civil wars, manipulated and bribed elections 
has covered up thefts, prostituted politics, impoverished 
the people, thwarted unity, left its agents in power 
against the will of the people, increased the cost of living, 
defended oppression, brought death. 
Nicaragua had (When Sandino rose) sold 
a part of its territory, had high foreign debts, 
its finance under the control of a syndicate 
of New York banks 
and no progress whatsoever •••• 
Nicaragua without the National Guard, I see the new day. 
A country without terror. Without dynastic tyranny. 
Zanata Clarinero, the whistler, sings 
no beggars, no prostitutes, no politicians 
There is no freedom as long as there are the wealthy 
as long as the freedom exists to exploit others. 
As long as there are classes, there is no freedom 
We were neither born to be handymen nor gentlemen, 
but instead to be brothers. 
We were born to be brothers. 
Capitalism -- what else but the purchase and sale 
of human beings? 
What type of a journey is this, brothers, 
to where are we headed with our first and third class tickets? 
Our nickel is awaiting the new human being 
our mahagony trees are awaiting the new human being 
livestock of good breed awaits the new human being 
all that is still missing is the new human being •••• 
Ernesto Cardenal 
Nationallied flir Nicaragua 
Peter Hammer Verlag: Wuppertal 
(original in Spanish; translated 
from German to English by Brigitte 
Schulz) 
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